

Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00 INRE-00

ACDE-00 /026 W

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R 101006Z APR 75

FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9088

INFO USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

S E C R E T MOSCOW 4920

EXDIS

E.O. 11652 XGDS-1

TAGS: PARM, UR, US

SUBJ: MIL'SHTEYN ON STRATEGIC REDUCTIONS

REF: A. MOSCOW 2891; B. MOSCOW 4625; C. MOSCOW 4892

1. MARSHALL SHULMAN, WHO HAS BEEN IN MOSCOW FOR THE PAST SEVERAL WEEKS, HAS PASSED TO US THE SUBSTANCE OF HIS CONVERSATIONS ON SALT WITH USA INSTITUTE'S GENERAL MIL'SHTEYN. WE ASK THAT SHULMAN BE STRICTLY PROTECTED AND THAT HIS NAME NOT BE USED IN CONNECTION WITH FURTHER USE OF THIS INFORMATION.

2. MIL'SHTEYN (WHO STRESSED HE WAS EXPRESSING HIS PERSONAL VIEW, SAYING HE WAS "NOT IN POSITION TO SEPAK FOR SOVIET LEADERSHIP") FOLLOWING UP ON SUGGESTIONS BY HAROLD BROWN AND ROBERT KLEIMAN (REF C), SAID THAT IT WOULD BE VERY USEFUL TO HAVE A DECLARATION OF INTENT SIGNED AFTER SALT TWO WHICH WOULD STATE THAT BOTH SIDES RECOGNIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF RESTRAINT IN FURTHER DEPLOYMENTS. THE DECLARATION COULD FURTHER SAY THAT NEITHER PARTY BELIEVES IT IS NECESSARY TO BUILD UP TO THE VLADIVOSTOK CEILINGS, AND EXPRESS THE INTENT TO START NEGOTIATIONS LOOKING TOWARD REDUCTIONS IN THESE CEILINGS.

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3. MIL'SHTEYN SAID THAT IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO

NEGOTIATE SUCH REDUCTIONS NOW, DURING SALT TWO. HE EXPLAINED THAT "THERE IS NOT ENOUGH MANPOWER" TO HANDLE TWO SETS OF NEGOTIATIONS. IN ADDITION, HE SAID, SALT TWO IS TURNING OUT TO HAVE SOME UNEXPECTED COMPLICATIONS, FOR WHICH HE LAID THE BLAME ON THE U.S.

4. MIL'SHTEYN SAID THAT U.S. REQUESTS FOR THE SOVITE UNION TO SHOW RESTRAINT IN DEPLOYING MIRV'ED LAND-BASED MISSILES WOULD HAVE TO BE BALANCED BY U.S. WILLINGNESS TO TAKE COMPARABLE STEPS. HE SAID IT WAS HIS PERSONAL OPINION THAT THE U.S. SHOULD SHOW RESTRAINT IN DEPLOYMENT OF THE FOLLOWING SYSTEMS:

A. TRIDENT. MIL'SHTEYN SAID THAT HE SAW TRIDENT AS "TRULY DESTABILIZING." HE SAID IT WAS AN ENTIRELY NEW SYSTEM WHICH COULD NOT BE EQUATED WITH PREVIOUS SEA-BASED SYSTEMS.

B. OTHER MOBILE SYSTEMS (HE DID NOT SPECIFY WHETHER AIR OR LAND).

C. MIRV DEPLOYMENTS. HE SAID HE REALIZED IT IS TOO LATE TO COMPLETELY STOP SUCH DEPLOYMENTS, BUT THEY SHOULD BE SOMEHOW LIMITED.

D. THE B-1. MIL'SHTEYN SAID THAT WITH SRAM, THE B-1 WOULD BE DESTABILIZING EVEN AGAINST THE STRONG SOVIET AIR DEFENSE.

E. R&D ON FURTHER IMPROVEMENTS IN ACCURACY AND DEVELOPMENT OF OTHER NEW SYSTEMS.

5. COMMENT: MIL'SHTEYN'S SEEMINGLY POSITIVE REACTION TO THE BROWN AND KLEIMAN SUGGESTIONS ON POST-SALT TWO STRATEGIC REDUCTIONS FOLLOWS THE SAME GENERAL LINES AS DID FELLOW USA INSTITUTE OFFICIAL SEMEYKO IN HIS EXPOSITION ON THE SAME SUBJECT (REF A). (THOUGH MIL'SHTEYN WAS PRESENT DURING CONVERSATION REORTED REF A, AT NO TIME DID HE EXPLICITLY ASSOCIATE HIMSELF WITH SEMEYKO'S VIEWS.) HIS OUTLINE OF NECESSARY NEGOTIATING MODALITIES PARALLELS
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THOSE WE RECEIVED FROM SEMEYKO. HIS EXPLANATION THAT SUCH REDUCTIONS CANNOT BE UNDERTAKEN BEFORE SIGNATURE OF SALT TWO BECAUSE OF THE LACK OF MANPOWER FOR SUCH COMPLICATED NEGOTIATIONS IS AT BEST DISINGENUOUS. WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT THE SOVIETS WANT THE SECURITY OF A SIGNED SALT TWO AGREEMENT BEFORE THEY EMBARK ON FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS. THEY MIGHT THEN, IF THESE STATEMENTS FROM THE USA INSTITUTE ARE ANY INDICATION OF OFFICIAL SOVIET

THINKING, MOVE TO NEGOTIATIONS ON REDUCTIONS, WITH
SIGNATURE ON THAT AGREEMENT CONTINGENT ON RATIFICATION
OF SALT TWO.

6. WE PRESUME THE "UNEXPECTED COMPLICATIONS" MIL'SHTEYN
REFERRED TO IN SALT TWO HAVE TO DO PRIMARILY WITH MIRV
VERIFICATION, A SUBJECT ON WHICH HE EXPRESSED CONCERN
TO THE AMBASSADOR DURING RECENT CONVERSATION (REF B).

7. HIS LIST OF ITEMS ON WHICH THE U.S. SHOULD SHOW
RESTRAINT IS A SHOPPING LIST WHICH PROBABLY FAR EXCEEDS
HIS ESTIMATE OF WHAT IS TRULY ACHIEVABLE. IN PREVIOUS
CONVERSATIONS WITH US, HE HAS MOST OFTEN EXPRESSED
CONCERN ON TRIDENT, IMPROVEMENTS IN ACCURACY, AND
DEVELOPMENT OF NEW SYSTEMS SUCH AS THE MX AND MARV.
STOESSEL

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: COLLECTIVE SECURITY, SALT (ARMS CONTROL), NEGOTIATIONS, MUTUAL FORCE REDUCTIONS, MILITARY POLICIES
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 10 APR 1975
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: GarlanWA
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975MOSCOW04920
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: X1
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D750125-0260
From: MOSCOW
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t19750463/aaaacfvx.tel
Line Count: 131
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 3
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: 75 MOSCOW 2891, 75 MOSCOW 4625, 75 MOSCOW 4892
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: GarlanWA
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 12 JUN 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <12 JUN 2003 by izenbei0>; APPROVED <17 JUL 2003 by GarlanWA>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
05 JUL 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MIL'SHTEYN ON STRATEGIC REDUCTIONS
TAGS: PARM, UR, US
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006